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“Reasoning together is, among other things, a way of responding to the sense that we 
need to repair or establish intersubjectivity.  Or to put it another way, it is a way of restoring or 
initiating purposeful coordination to our several actions or behaviors.”—Chris Campolo 
 
 In this paper, I wish to call attention to the notion of the “interruption” in the space of 
intersubjectivity developed by Professor Campolo.  His cases follow rather neatly, I think, 
contexts established in American argumentation: the surgeons being part of the technical sphere 
of argument; the house builders being confronted with a condition of social reasoning; and the 
threats of crime or warning being part of a public issue.  In each case, I think it is important to 
illustrate that “interruptions” work differently, with alternative causes and solutions. Expert 
reasoning and practical argument are contextually defined and repaired to sustain intersubjective 
conditions, I think.  Often in the public sphere, however, repair work is limited to building a 
common cause rather than restoring common ground. Questions of intersubjectivity are 
suspended in political bridging. The worry that “higher order” principles threaten spurious 
agreement in the context of the politics, I show to be an unwarranted concern. 
 First, examine the common ground afforded by the technical sphere of argument. The 
reasons of surgeons aim at decision-making within a circumstance where a specialized 
predicament has arisen. On the one hand, there are sets of expectations that define a project as a 
common enterprise with everyone familiar with one another’s role or part to play.  The common 
enterprise has a shared history, is regulated by established procedure, involves the skilled, 
sequential use of tools for defined ends, in a time limited circumscribed operation.  Cutting a 
person open from sternum to stomach becomes “reasonable” only because of such an elaborated 
specialized code of understanding, and such activity is the very common ground upon which 
activities stemming from expert training and professional identity are undertaken—individually 
or in teams.  In this sense, common ground is not an abstract, overarching principle minimizing 
difference. Rather, it is the hard-won stuff of state of the art practices backed by the epistemic 
certification of relevant fields. 
The case of the “interruption” in routines is a quite interesting moment, and illustrates the 
problem with reasoning and the technical sphere or systems world. Campolo sees a disruption as 
repairable if a choice falls within the domain of expertise of the cooperative actors: two surgeons 
are more likely to know how to make a choice about organ slicing than about repairing 
equipment or resolving a power outage.  However, interruptions have a way of problematizing 
practice more deeply, sometimes.  
Failures to unfold expectations stirs an interesting variety of argument because when 
something does not happen like expected, one cannot know exactly why, strictly speaking, and 
not knowing why, one cannot know the extent of departure from the norm, even if a set of 
backup protocols are in place as correctives to situations that appear anomalous. In fact, 
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interruptions have a comic way of confounding reason, as efforts to correct a situation sometimes 
don’t work for a different reason and exacerbate the problem. Moreover, under limited time 
pressures arise to put things back in place quickly and mistakes are made. For such reasons, 
interruptions stress and test the competencies of cooperative reasons.  Interruptions in technical 
reason sometimes generate “cascade failures” where a weakness in one part of the operation gets 
passed on by the system such that operations can appear to be going smoothly while the system 
itself is failing.  The army corps of engineers, smoothed kinks and damned tributaries of the 
Mississippi—each collaboration a success—never dreaming they were collaborating in 
producing a monumental flood in a season of record rain. Finally, there is no guarantee that state-
of-the art itself will not someday be seen as unjustified. For years, surgeons got rid of bad 
humors with leeches and bleeding; clearly not in the health interests of patients, although correct 
by state of the art standards. Better technical reasons sometimes exacerbate rather than overcome 
blind spots.  
 Turn, next, to common grounds afforded by practical reason.  If we switch from 
cooperation in the context of expertise to that of the world of practice, we find a different set of 
issues.  Campolo’s loose alliance of builders are confounded by two predicaments: What does 
one do when the authorities will not accept work as sound? What does one do when nature 
intervenes to stop work?  The kind of reasoning required here may be technical in nature; that is, 
attorneys are consulted and the risks of winning litigation assessed.  More likely, the situation 
calls for ingenium.  It is a long standing custom in many counties to simply bribe inspectors, play 
politics with boards in asking for variances, or ignore detail specifications. A house is a matter of 
workmanship not blueprints in the end. Solutions are invented.  When nature intervenes, 
invention replaces guidelines. In Texas this spring, an alligator was found in a children’s wading 
pond. A contractor roped it, dragged the animal—jaws flapping and all—behind his pickup, and 
shot it.  This action, though not an aesthetic triumph by current animal control standards, was 
effective.  Ingenious solutions tend to be short term, seat-of-the-pants, seemed-good-at-the-time 
reasons that are vulnerable to second-guessing over the long run.  Just as technical reason risks 
cascade failure, improvisation risks legitimation problems. 
 Finally, examine common ground in relation to changes that transcend expertise and 
individual initiative, and can only properly be addressed collectively, through public argument. 
The problem of interruption of the lifeworld happens when there is some change effecting the 
collectivity that cannot be resolved either through expertise or improvisation, although I would 
suggest that social change—like a crime wave—brings on both efforts to expertly deploy police 
resources and to take individual initiatives (like gun ownership, alarms or self-imposed travel 
restrictions).  At some threshold point, both individual initiatives and institutional initiatives are 
recognized to be insufficient.  Now, at this level “intersubjectivity” may not play a role in 
restoring the capacity to reason effectively together; how my generation is going to be effected 
by global warming is not the same as another, the crime rate in my area is not the same as in 
yours.  With larger problems, reasoners have to confront the fact that argument moves from 
common ground, with its intersubjective security and repair issues, to common cause.   
 Argument by common cause is defined by a sufficient fund of reasons for collaborative 
action that is more worthwhile for individuals or groups to act in concert rather than to ignore or 
oppose one another, at least for a while.  To achieve common cause, interlocutors do not have to 
reach a meeting of the minds, much less assume a position that discloses a full reaching 
intersubjective bond of mutual identification.  Common cause is practical politics, a way of 
reaching agreement while acknowledging difference in interests.  Common cause reasoning 
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results in temporary solutions that ameliorate rather than resolve issues. Typically, its arguments 
reframe political alliances rather than reinforce old divisions 
Common cause is not built primarily on trust but on interest and the bridges among 
different groups do not need to be repaired, nor can they, because the only traffic that counts is 
the particular link that serves the individual interests of a joint activity.  This is true for market 
logic, where individual interest is sometimes maximized by restraint of trade. It is also true in the 
realm of politics, where joint opposition to pornography on the part of feminists and 
fundamentalists achieve a joint goal, whereas one group sees itself undercutting the lynch-pin of 
patriarchy while the other extending proper patriarchal protections.   
 Common cause arguments are of a particular kind, and are not at risk to the same type of 
disappointments as Dworkin’s “higher principles” that somehow would entangle opposing 
groups in an abstract premise leading to misestimations of the domains of agreement or false 
as[c]sent.  When issues are abstracted to a high enough level to squeeze agreements out of 
difference, then the notion of “common ground” finds a “common” denominator but at the 
expense of loosing its standing as “ground,” for the grounds of argument are not premised 
statements but broad territories of invention from which arguments are uttered from the contexts 
of specialized training, artisanship skills, or streams of public discourses.  Abstractions are 
abstractions precisely because they do not ground but provide a vantage from which the 
imagination can spin criticism, critique, commentary, and even foresee possibilities of Utopic 
revision.  Sometimes abstractions provide disruptions immediate and compelling enough to 
shake the grounds of practice, but whether such interruptions such as the Declarations of the 
Rights of Man or the Emancipation Proclamation create useful common ground or submerge 
difference is not automatically dangerous, but more of an open question. 
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